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2151 
SYMPOSIUM 
THE GOALS OF ANTITRUST 
FOREWORD:  
ANTITRUST’S PURSUIT OF PURPOSE 
Barak Orbach* 
 
Consumer welfare is the stated goal of U.S. antitrust law.  It was offered 
to resolve contradictions and inconsistencies in antitrust.  The Supreme 
Court adopted it believing that “Congress designed the Sherman Act as a 
‘consumer welfare prescription.’” Alas, since the introduction of the 
standard, antitrust has been searching for its purpose.  This Foreword 
introduces the debate on the goals of antitrust and briefly presents 
perspectives in this debate. 
In 1963, fifty years before the publication of this Symposium, Robert 
Bork embarked a fifteen-year journey in antitrust.  His journey opened with 
a provocative essay in Fortune magazine that he wrote with his colleague at 
Yale Law School, Ward Bowman:  The Crisis in Antitrust.1  It ended in 
1978 with the publication of his influential book The Antitrust Paradox.2 
Bork’s journey in antitrust focused on actual and perceived contradictions 
and inconsistencies in antitrust law.  It was part of a broad intellectual-
ideological movement that built a body of scholarship, expressing 
confidence in markets and skepticism in the government.3  Bork’s antitrust 
scholarship was exceptionally influential.4  The Supreme Court endorsed 
some of his policy prescriptions.  Most prominently, in 1979, in Reiter v. 
Sonotone, relying in Bork’s academic work, the Supreme Court declared 
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 1. Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Crisis in Antitrust, FORTUNE, Dec. 
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 2. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX:  A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978). 
 3. For general characteristics of this movement, see Barak Orbach, What Is 
Government Failure?, 31 YALE J. REG. ONLINE (forthcoming 2013), available at http://
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Deficit, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2543 (2013). 
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that “Congress designed the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare 
prescription.’”5  Since then, “consumer welfare” has been serving as the 
stated goal of U.S. competition laws.6 
There is no debate that “consumer welfare” is the stated goal of antitrust 
law, nor is there any disagreement that the Supreme Court’s adoption of the 
consumer welfare standard was done with no discussion and was erroneous.  
However, the introduction of the consumer welfare standard sparked a great 
controversy over the meaning of the term in antitrust and the desirable goals 
of antitrust.  It is fair to state that the introduction of the standard placed 
antitrust at war with itself.  In effect, the consumer welfare standard 
established an antitrust paradox of the kind Robert Bork sought to resolve. 
Antitrust has been searching for its purpose since the introduction of the 
consumer welfare standard.7  This pursuit of purpose has opportunity costs 
that have inevitably burdened intellectual progress in antitrust.  David 
Hyman and William Kovacic vividly described conflicts surrounding 
antitrust’s pursuit of purpose: 
 U.S. antitrust professors have their own version of the Marquess of 
Queensberry Rules.  The most important rule is that arguments about the 
merits of any given case, dispute, or regulatory decision/action must be 
faithful to the Gospel of Antitrust (i.e., the specific history, logic, and 
objectives that justified the adoption of the U.S. competition laws in the 
first place). 
 Of course, it complicates matters slightly that there are at least three 
competing versions of the Gospel:  the Chicago School, the post–Chicago 
School, and the Market-Egalitarian School.8 
Reflecting on his policy prescription for the goal of antitrust in 1967, 
Robert Bork noted:  “If I am correct, reform is needed, but it need not come 
from Congress.  Antitrust policy is determined . . . by the Supreme Court.”9  
The works in this Symposium illustrate that a reform is indeed needed.  By 
defining the goal of antitrust with an ambiguous phrase, the Supreme Court 
created a redundant pursuit of purpose that has been feeding debates in the 
field.  The Court, therefore, should consider the meaning of the goals of 
antitrust laws. 
In 1979, the Supreme Court adopted the consumer welfare standard with 
no discussion.  The Court has been referring to and applying this standard 
 
 5. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (quoting BORK, supra note 2, at 
66).  For the events that led to the adoption of the “consumer welfare” standard, see Barak 
Orbach, How Antitrust Lost Its Goal, 81 FORDHAM L. REV 2253 (2013). 
 6. See generally Barak Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox, 
7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 133 (2011). 
 7. See also Jonathan B. Baker, Economics and Politics:  Perspectives on the Goals and 
Future of Antitrust, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2175, 2180 (2013) (“Our conversation about the 
goals of antitrust is unusual when compared with the way legal scholars talk about other 
fields.”); Eleanor M. Fox, Against Goals, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2157 (2013). 
 8. David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Institutional Design, Agency Life Cycle, 
and the Goals of Competition Law, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2163, 2163 (2013). 
 9. Robert H. Bork, The Goals of Antitrust Policy, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 242, 242 (1967). 
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ever since although it has never considered its (lack of) meaning or 
soundness.  The Court may keep doing so for a few more decades.  Such a 
path, however, takes the logic out of antitrust law, leaving “bad economics 
and worse jurisprudence.”10  The Symposium in this issue of the Fordham 
Law Review offers a collection of perspectives on the goals of antitrust 
laws, written by a diverse group of antitrust scholars.  Our works present 
the controversy and refer to other key works in this debate. 
Most of the works in this Symposium expressly criticize the 
unproductive nature of the debate over the goals of antitrust, stressing the 
need for clarity.  For example Eleanor Fox dedicated her provocative essay, 
Against Goals, to this point, arguing that the goals controversy “has 
obscured the real debate, which is about how to achieve robust markets.”11  
Herbert Hovenkamp observed that “[t]he volume and complexity of the 
academic debate . . . creates an impression of policy significance that is 
completely belied by the case law, and largely by government enforcement 
policy.  Few if any decisions have turned on the difference” between the 
competing approaches.”12 The debate consists of a large number of 
perspectives, some of them conflict and others complement each other. 
(a) The Borkean Perspective.  Robert Bork sparked the controversy by 
arguing that the goal of antitrust ought to be “allocative efficiency,” which 
he equated with the phrase “consumer welfare.”  Further, Bork believed that 
the word “competition” was confusing, because the word is mostly “a 
shorthand expression for consumer welfare.”13  In this Symposium, Herbert 
Hovenkamp argues that the “dominant view of antitrust policy . . . is that 
. . . antitrust promotes allocative efficiency.”14  Alan Meese presents the 
theoretical foundations of the debate, arguing that the competing welfare 
standards are inherently flawed and making the case for efficiency as the 
goal of antitrust.15 
(b) The Original Intent Perspective.  The stated goal of antitrust is 
“consumer welfare” because, in 1979, the Supreme Court casually stated 
that “Congress designed the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare 
prescription.’”16  One layer of the goal controversy is influenced by another 
controversy—the role “originalism” should play in statutory interpretation.  
Robert Bork was a vocal advocate of originalism.  While the Supreme 
Court endorsed his findings regarding the original intent of the Sherman 
 
 10. Id. 
 11. Fox, supra note 7, at 2161. 
 12. Herbert Hovenkamp, Implementing Antitrust’s Welfare Goals, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2471, 2474 (2013). 
 13. BORK, supra note 2, at 61.  For discussion of Bork’s thesis, see Orbach, supra note 
6; Orbach, supra note 5. 
 14. Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 2471. 
 15. Alan J. Meese, Reframing the (False?) Choice Between Purchaser Welfare and 
Total Welfare, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2197 (2013). 
 16. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (quoting BORK, supra note 2, at 
66).  For the events that led to the adoption of the “consumer welfare” standard, see Orbach, 
supra note 5, at 2268–75. 
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Act, these findings have no support in the record.  Thus, the debate over the 
goals of antitrust has kept antitrust scholars studying the legislative history 
of a statute enacted in 1890.  In this Symposium, Dale Collins provides a 
study of the rise of the nineteenth century trusts and their influence on 
antitrust legislation.17  My Essay presents the state of economic thinking at 
the end of the nineteenth century, and argues that, at the time, the meaning 
of “no trusts and combinations” was “competition.”18 
(c) The Consumer Welfare Perspective.  In 1982, Robert Lande 
introduced the most influential critique of Bork’s study of the legislative 
intent of the Sherman Act.19  Lande argued that, by passing the Sherman 
Act, Congress indeed intended to promote consumer welfare, not 
“efficiency” as Bork proposed.  Put simply, Lande argued that “consumer 
welfare” means “consumer welfare,” rather than “efficiency.”  In the three 
decades that followed Lande and others have developed a meaning for 
antitrust consumer welfare.20  In this Symposium, Robert Lane explains his 
critique of efficiency and the rationale for his thesis that prescribes 
“consumer choice” as the original and desirable goal of antitrust law.21  
Commissioner Joshua Wright and Judge Douglas Ginsburg disagree.22  
They argue that consumer welfare cannot serve as a goal of antitrust law, 
even though we refer to the goal with the phrase “consumer welfare.” 
(d) The Anti-Trust Perspective.  The origins of U.S. competition laws lie 
in efforts to address the rise of the nineteenth century trusts.23  Fears of 
bigness have remained as shadows in antitrust.24  The sentiments of 
protecting consumers and small businesses from large businesses have 
evolved and transformed over time but have never vanished.  John 
Kirkwood’s Article provides a modern exposition for the goal of 
“protecting consumers and small suppliers from anticompetitive conduct.”25 
(e) The Consumer Surplus Perspective.  The antitrust methodology 
utilizes a framework of partial equilibrium that does not accommodate 
welfare estimates.26  This economic framework, however, can 
accommodate surplus analysis when data is available.  The difference 
 
 17. Wayne D. Collins, Trusts and the Origins of Antitrust Legislation, 81 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2279 (2013). 
 18. Orbach, supra note 5. 
 19. Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers As the Original and Primary Concern of 
Antitrust:  The Efficiency interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982). 
 20. See, e.g., Robert Lande & Neil Averitt, Using the “Consumer Choice Approach to 
Antitrust Law, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 175 (2007). 
 21. Robert H. Lande, A Traditional and Textualist Analysis of the Goals of Antitrust:  
Efficiency, Preventing Theft from Consumers, and Consumer Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2349 (2013). 
 22. Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, The Goals of Antitrust:  Welfare Trumps 
Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2405 (2013). 
 23. See generally Collins, supra note 17; Barak Orbach & Grace Campbell Rebling, The 
Antitrust Curse of Bigness, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 605 (2012). 
 24. Orbach & Campbell, supra note 23. 
 25. John B. Kirkwood, The Essence of Antitrust:  Protecting Consumers and Small 
Suppliers from Anticompetitive Conduct, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425, 2469 (2013). 
 26. See generally Meese, supra note 15; Orbach, supra note 6. 
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between surplus and welfare is significant.  Surplus is merely the difference 
between the two values:  willingness to pay and price, or the price charged 
customers and the seller’s cost.  Welfare incorporates all effects of a 
particular activity; it is the surplus plus the actual effects on well-being.27  
One economic version of the “consumer welfare” standard equates the 
phrase with “consumer surplus.”  This approach effectively means that the 
goal of antitrust is to protect low prices. 
(f) The Total Surplus Perspective.  Many antitrust scholars argue that the 
focus on consumer surplus may prevent firms from gaining efficiencies, if 
such efficiencies would result in price increases.  They therefore argue that 
the current goal of antitrust, “consumer welfare,” ought instead to be “total 
surplus.”28  Under this standard, an action or conduct may be socially 
desirable even if it results in a decrease in the consumer surplus because of 
offsetting gains in the producer surplus.  Roger Blair and Daniel Sokol 
explain this approach and its significance.29  Herbert Hovenkamp compares 
differences between the consumer surplus and the total surplus 
perspectives.30 
(g) Competition. My Essay in this Symposium shows that until the 
introduction of the consumer welfare standard, “competition” was 
understood to be the goal of antitrust law.31  Robert Bork argued that the 
word competition was too vague and confusing to be used in antitrust 
policy and generally served as “a shorthand expression for consumer 
welfare.”32  His consumer welfare prescription replaced the goal of 
competition to enhance clarity in antitrust.  The goal controversy is the 
outcome of this erroneous premise.  I argue that competition should indeed 
serve as the goal of U.S. competition laws, that is, antitrust. 
(h) The Noneconomic Perspective.  Robert Bork criticized antitrust for 
the use of “bad economics.”33  Some of his critics rejected the notion that 
economics exclusively governs antitrust.  They pointed out that politics, 
values, and ideology have always played a role in antitrust, and in fact 
influenced Bork’s own analysis.  The modern noneconomic perspective 
consists of two threads that acknowledge the influence of political and 
ideological forces on antitrust.  They differ in their normative starting point.  
One thread perceives such influence as desirable, while the other accepts it 
as an inevitable reality.  Several works in this Symposium present this 
 
 27. To illustrate the difference, consider the consumer choice to purchase cigarettes.  
The surplus differs from the welfare because of health effects.  This is true both for the 
consumer welfare and the total surplus because of externalities.  Similar analysis applies to 
most products. 
 28. The classic exposition is Oliver E. Williamson, Economies As an Antitrust Defense:  
The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968). 
 29. Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, Welfare Standards in U.S. and E.U. Antitrust 
Enforcement, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2497 (2013). 
 30. Hovenkamp, supra note 12. 
 31. Orbach, supra note 5. 
 32. BORK, supra note 2, at 61. For discussion of Bork’s thesis, see Orbach, supra note 6; 
Orbach, supra note 5. 
 33. Bork, supra note 9, at 242. 
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perspective.  Alan Meese frames the debate over economic standards and 
observes that “[t]he choice between competing definitions of ‘consumer 
welfare’ is ultimately a normative one; economic theory cannot make the 
choice for us.  At the same time, such theory can inform or frame the debate 
in a way that might influence the normative outcome.”34  Maurice Stucke 
rejects the idea that “[c]ourts and enforcers should . . . constrict competition 
policy to narrow economic goals.”35  Rather, Stucke proposes that they 
“must reincorporate competition law’s political, social, and moral 
objectives.”36  Harry First and Spencer Waller provide an account of the 
role of antitrust in a democratic society.37  Jonathan Baker expresses 
unequivocal confidence in the “indispensable role of economics in shaping 
and applying modern antitrust” and explained how political forces influence 
antitrust policy.38  Finally, Commissioner Joshua Wright and Judge 
Douglas Ginsburg provide a sharp critique of the use of noneconomic 
criteria in antitrust analysis.39  They do not deny the influence of 
noneconomic forces on antitrust but explain why noneconomic perspective 
should not be actively used in antitrust analysis. 
(i) The Institutional Perspective. While antitrust has been searching for 
its purpose, antitrust agencies have been enforcing antitrust laws.  Two 
papers in this Symposium address the practical aspects of enforcement.  
David Hyman and William Kovacic posit that reality is much more nuanced 
than the academic debate and, in practice, competition agencies try to 
promote many goals.40  Finally, Steven Salop offers a comprehensive 
analytical framework for merger settlement that clarifies the most practical 
aspect of today’s antitrust enforcement and illustrates the practicability of 
the controversy over the goals.41 
 
 34. Meese, supra note 15, at 2199. 
 35. Maurice E. Stucke, Should Competition Policy Promote Happiness?, 81 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2575, 2645 (2013). 
 36. Id. 
 37. First & Waller, supra note 3. 
 38. Baker, supra note 7, at 2176. 
 39. Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 22. 
 40. Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 8. 
 41. Steven C. Salop, Merger Settlement and Enforcement Policy for Optimal Deterrence 
and Maximum Welfare, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2647 (2013). 
